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Abstract  
This  paper  explores  the  thought  of  Paul  Ricœur  from  a  feminist  point  of  view.  My  goal  is  to  show  that  it  is  
necessary  to  narrate  differently  the  history  of  our  culture  –  in  particular,  the  history  of  philosophy  –  in  order  
for   wommen   to   attain   a   self-­‐‑representation   that   is   equal   to   that   of   men.   I   seek   to   show   that   Ricoeur’s  
philosophy  –  especially  his  approach  to  the  topics  of  memory  and  history,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  human  
capacity  for  initiative,  on  the  other  hand–  can  support  the  idea  that  it   is  possible  and  legitimate  to  tell  our  
history  otherwise  by  envisioning  a  more  accurate  truth  about  ourselves.    
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Résumé  
Dans   ce   texte   je   veux   explorer   la   pensée   de   Paul   Ricœur   d’un   point   de   vue   féministe.  Mon   but   c’est   de  
démontrer  qu’il  faut  raconter  autrement  l’histoire  de  notre  culture  –notamment  l’histoire  de  la  philosophie  -­‐‑  
afin   que   les   femmes   puissent   atteindre   une   représentation   de   soi   égalitaire   à   celle   des   hommes.   Je   veux  
démontrer  que  la  philosophie  de  Ricœur  -­‐‑  surtout  les  thèmes  de  la  mémoire  et  de  l’histoire,  d’une  part,  et  
celui  de  la  capacité  humaine  d’initiative,  de  l’autre  -­‐‑  peut  soutenir  l’idée  qu’il  est  possible  et  légitime  de  nous  
raconter  notre  histoire  autrement  envisageant  une  vérité  plus  juste  sur  nous-­‐‑mêmes.  
Mots-­‐‑clés:  Féminisme,  Ricœur,  Histoire,  Mémoire,  Identité  
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Overview  
The  starting  point  of  this  article  comes  from  both  a  direct  and  indirect  experience  of  a  sort  
of  invisibility  which  prompts  a  structural  absence  of  history  within  Women’s  Studies.  On  the  one  
hand,   it   is   as   if   they  will   not   develop  properly,   and,   on   the   other   hand,   they   seem   to   have  no  
repercussions   at   all.   One   can   notice   a   constant   lament,   at   the   beginning   of   any   text   or  
investigation   on   feminism,   of   the   fact   that   it   still   looks   as   if   such   an   approach   must   start  
everything   afresh   –   as   nothing   has   been   done   before   on   the   subject.   Some   scholars,   like  Mary  
Whaite  –  who  led  the  enterprise  of  publishing  a  History  of  Philosophy  from  the  point  of  view  of  
Woman1   –   regrets   some   pejorative   comments   from  her   colleagues   on   the   dubious   interest   and  
philosophical  relevance  of  her  project,  along  with  the  difficulties  she  and  her  team  had  to  face  in  
order  to  obtain  reliable  information  about  women  of  the  past  to  proceed  with  their  work.2        
Moreover   –   and,   perhaps,   even   as   a   consequence   of   the   above-­‐‑stated   ideas   –   the  main  
results   of   feminist   research  as  well   as   a   feminist  perspective  on  philosophical   topics   are  barely  
mentioned   in   general   anthologies.   What   interests   me   here   is   to   highlight   the   Histories   of  
Philosophy.   Even   though   at   this   moment   one   can   already   rely   on   a   significant   amount   of  
published  material   on   the   contribution   of  women   to   the   development   of  western   tradition,   no  
General   History   of   Philosophy   or   –   for   instance   –   no   History   of   20th   Century   Philosophy   has  
incorporated  the  outcome  of  those  researches  or,  at  least,  incorporated  such  debate.  This  state  of  
affairs  is  the  result  of  an  outright  denial  of  an  academic  shelter  for  gender  questions,  along  with  
an   absence   of   criticism   to   a   standard   theoretical   heritage   or   aiming   at   building   a   different  
memory  of   the  past.  As  a  result,  philosophers  still  narrate   their  cultural  heritage  as   if  Women’s  
Studies  does  not  exist.  Thus  the  very  possibility  of  having  a  different  collective  memory  laying  to  
women   a   better   (and   fairer)   place,   which   would   allow   for   a   better   self-­‐‑understanding   of  
Humankind  as  a  whole,  is  barred  from  the  outset.      
Relying  on   the  background  of   the   above-­‐‑mentioned  experience,   I  will  here   address   the  
Phenomenological   Hermeneutics   of   Paul   Ricœur   –   especially   the   topics   of   memory,   history,  
identity  and  recognition.  My  aim  is   to  find  out  how  the  Ricœurian  approach  to  such  topics  can  
legitimate  and  even  display  the  necessity  of  searching  into  the  western  philosophical  tradition  for  
“a   gender   perspective.”   I   thus   aim   to   fill   in   a   thematic   emptiness   regarding   an   exploration   of  
Ricœur’s   thought   from   the   point   of   view   of   feminism3.   When   people   want   to   recall   French  
philosophers  that,  admittedly,  could  have  matched  the  theoretical  needs  of  Women’s  Studies,  the  
names   of   Foucault,   Derrida   or   Deleuze   spread   to   mind   –   but   usually   not   the   name   of   Paul  
Ricœur.  4  I  would  like  to  show  that  Ricœur’s  thought  can  just  as  well  match  the  theoretical  needs  
of  Women’s  Studies.    
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In  the  1970’s,  Judy  Chicago  –  in  order  to  give  prominence  to  the  role  of  those  women  who  
strongly  contributed  to  the  development  of  collective  life,  whether  by  concrete  deeds  or  symbolic  
means  –,  conducted  the  Dinner  Party  project.  She  did  so  while  holding  the  idea  that  “our  heritage  
is   our   power.”   My   text   has   a   similar   goal:   to   show   how   urgent   it   is   to   find   in   our   tradition  
alternative  ways  of   thinking   the   feminine,  ways   that  were  not  properly  developed   in  canonical  
anthropological   readings.   By   doing   so,  we  will   be   providing  women  with   different  models   to  
build  up  more  rewarding  images  of  themselves  and  with  more  positive  patterns  of  reference  for  
structuring  their  own  identities.  In  this  context,  I  want  to  show  that  it   is  not  only  legitimate  but  
even  necessary  to  recount  differently  the  history  of  our  culture  and  the  history  of  philosophy  in  
particular,  if  we  are  to  find  new  texts,  new  authors  and  new  interpretations  which  might  uncover  
the  role  of  women  within  the  whole  dynamics  of  thought  and  life.    
The  proposal  developed  here  will  articulate  three  dimensions  of  the  theoretical  issue  we  
are   dealing   with:   1)   its   necessity;   2)   its   possibility;   3)   its   fruitfulness.   The   necessity   and  
fruitfulness  of  a  specific  approach  to  feminism  within  the  history  of  ideas  represent  two  sides  of  
the  same  theoretical  urgency  to  reformulate  what  has  been  said  about  women  and  the  feminine  in  
the   western   tradition.   The   possibility   of   such   an   approach   is   inextricably   related   to   its  
correspondent   legitimacy.  My   text  will   thus  be  structured   in   two  parts.   In   the   first  one   I  will  be  
evidencing   both   the   necessity   and   fruitfulness   of   going   after   new   readings   of   the   past.   In   the  
second  one  the  hermeneutic  legitimacy  of  such  pursuit  will  be  highlighted.    
The  Necessity  and  Use  of  Different  Narratives  of  the  Past  
In  The  Course   of  Recognition  Ricœur   states   that   feminist  movements  helped   to  make   the  
issue   of   recognition   popular,   and   still   adds   that   those   movements   claim   for   their   members   a  
specific  identity,  thus  allowing  them  both  to  be  recognized  as  a  group  and  to  improve  their  self-­‐‑
esteem  and  social  impact.  Ricœur  insists  upon  the  importance  of  recognition  in  the  shaping  of  our  
identity,  making  two  claims:  
• The  identity  of  historically  determined  groups  is  a  component  of  a  temporal  dimension  
“that   embraces  discrimination  against   these  groups   in  a  past   that  may  date  back  a   few  
centuries.”5  
• It  is  necessary  to  make  a  “reversed  discrimination”  towards  those  groups.    
These  claims  have  a  double  support:  on  the  one  hand,  they  fit  and  even  come  in  the  sequence  of  
Ricœur’s   thought   on   the   triangular   connection   of   memory,   history   and   identity;   on   the   other  
hand,   they   instantiate   his  mode   of   thinking   in   dialogue  with   other   trends   of   thought   –   in   the  
present  case,  with  several  approaches  to  recognition.  The  above  ideas  serve  as  the  starting  point  
for  showing  a  lack  of  theoretical  recognition  towards  all  those  readings  proposing  new  frames  of  
analysis  for  the  status  of  women  and  the  feminine.  A  certain  marginalization,  or  even  an  outright  
blindness  against  those  readings,  attests  to  this  lack  of  recognition.  I  would  mention  two  further  
aspects  that  confirm  such  attitude.    
First,   in   the   critical   review   of   an   excellent   anthology   published   in   2000   by   Françoise  
Collin,   Evely   Pisier   and   Elene   Varikas   –  Les   Femmes   de   Platon   à  Derrida   –,  Michèle   Riot-­‐‑Sarcey  
shows   that   the   book   stresses   the   fact   that   women   could   not   have   been   subjects   of   History6,  
because  it  is  as  if  they  do  not  belong  to  History.  According  to  the  author  of  the  critical  review,  the  
texts  presented  in  the  anthology  seem  themselves  not  to  be  part  of  History,  since  they  all  report  




Études  Ricœuriennes  /  Ricœur  Studies          
Vol  4,  No  1  (2013)        ISSN  2155-­‐‑1162  (online)        DOI  10.5195/errs.2013.172      http://ricoeur.pitt.edu      
9  
  
had   no   impact   upon   the   anthropological   conceptions   depicted.7   All   the   texts   associate  women  
with   evil,   sin,   nature,   with   sensibility   and   sexuality   and,   simultaneously,   consider   these  
categories  to  be  secondary  and  necessarily  subsumed  to  those  of  culture,  intellectual  or  rational  –  
all   these   belonging   to   the  masculine.      Now,   the   anthropological   question   is   absolutely   crucial  
when   it   comes   to   think  on   the   relation  between   the   two   sexes  with   equity.  That   is  why  Nancy  
Tuana  has  created  the  collection  Re-­‐‑reading  the  Canon  –  its  primary  target  being  to  seek  what  she  
calls   “gender   sub-­‐‑texts”   present   in   canonical   texts   of   the   philosophical   tradition,   so   that  
conceptions   of   the   feminine   and   women   can   be   brought   to   light   and   widely   discussed.   This  
collection   points   out   two   things:   1)   Philosophical   positions   have   not   been   pure   or   neutral   and  
what  we  persistently  call  “  universal  ”  is  no  such  thing  and  has  not  taken  into  account  half  of  the  
humanity;  2)  Philosophy  (the  History  of  Philosophy)  had  a  great  deal  of  responsibility  in  shaping  
social  representations  of  women  and  the  feminine.    
Second,   in   a   Portuguese   overview   of   social   representations   in   the   mid-­‐‑1990s,8   Lígia  
Amâncio   inquired   upon   stereotyped   social   representations   of   the   two   sexes.   The   extensive  
bibliographical  update  she  performed  then  reveals  several  important  criteria  for  this  issue.  On  the  
one  hand  –  and  relying  also  on  data  from  previous  foreign  studies  on  the  same  topic  –  Amâncio’s  
overview  presented  the  results  of  terminological  and  psychological  inquiries  which  associate  the  
masculine   with   such   notions   as   (1)   objectivity;   (2)   independence   and   (3)   dominance,   and   the  
feminine  with   such   others   as   (1)   expressivity;   (2)   dependence   and   (3)   submission.   These   terms  
allow   for   the   conclusion   that   social   relationships,   despite   being   structured   on   the   basis   of  
symbolic   patterns,   convert   these   patterns   into   concrete,   objective   and   universal   differences  
between  the  sexes,   thus  projecting  a  real  asymmetry  between   the   ideas  of  man  and  woman.  At  
the   same   time,   research   on   the   same   topic   in   Portugal   also   had   an   interesting   outcome   to   the  
present   study.   In   fact,   it   shows:   (1)   a   division   between  masculine   and   feminine,   in   accordance  
with   the  aforementioned   terms  –   rationality  and  objectivity   for   the  masculine  and  emotion  and  
sensibility   to   the  feminine;   (2)  how  the  masculine   is  associated  with  a  position  of  superiority   in  
contrast  with  the  feminine,  clearly  marked  by  features  of  inferiority,  whether  explicit  or  implicit.  
The  masculine  is  Brave,  Dominant,  Strong,  Independent  and  Combative,  whereas  the  feminine  is  
Curious,  Dependent,  Fragile,  Inferior,  Sweet  and  Sentimental.    
In  my  interpretation,  this  set  of  remarks  is  absolutely  consonant  with  Ricœur’s  statement  
that  there  are  some  groups  whose  identity  has  been  discriminated  “in  a  past  that  may  date  back  a  
few  centuries”  and  towards  and  for  which  it  is  necessary  to  make  “a  reverse  discrimination.”  In  
other  words,  theoretical  approaches  to  women  and  the  feminine  do  not  provide  a  fair  standard  of  
reference   so   that   they   can   build   up   a   balanced   and   equanimous   social   identity.      Given   this  
scenario,   it   seems   necessary   to   find   different   and   dissonant   points   of   view   allowing   us   to  
overcome   this   secular   past   of   discrimination.   And   for   doing   this   Paul   Ricœur   will   be   mon  
compagnon  de  route.    
Memory,  History  and  Identity:  The  Duty  of  Building  a  Critical  Memory  of  
Women  
The  core  of  the  present  exploration  of  Ricœur’s  thought  is  based  on  his  Memory,  History,  
Forgetting9   –   especially   on   two   central   topics   of   that   book:   (1)   the   relationship   among   history,  
memory  and  identity,  and  (2)  the  point  of  embedding  a  critical  memory  within  the  philosophical  
notion  of  the  duty  of  memory.  In  exploring  these  two  main  ideas,  I  want  to  show  that  it  is  essential  
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to   build   a   critical   collective   memory   of   some   conceptions   of   the   feminine   that   are   still   not  
available  to  women  –  whether  in  the  canon  or  in  classroom  syllabi.    
In  choosing  this  line  of  thought  I  distance  myself  from  to  the  polemics  raised  by  Memory,  
History,   Forgetting   within   part   of   the   French   intellectual   elites   which   attacked   the   book   for   its  
supposed  aim  in  fading  the  idea  of  the  duty  of  memory.10  Quite  the  contrary,  I  believe  that  the  duty  
of  memory  is  precisely  the  ethical  imperative  standing  behind  Ricœur’s  work,  and  this  being  the  
case,  it  legitimates  the  need  to  narrate  differently  the  content  of  our  memories  and,  through  them,  
the  content  of  our  history.  Of  course,  the  critical  target  of  Ricœur’s  approach  was  not  the  question  
of   women   or   the   feminine   –   his   main   concern   was   the   Shoa   –,   but   the   way   he   critically  
approached  this  issue  allows  for  adaptations  to  other  subjects,  such  as  our  present  topic.  
Memory,  History,  Forgetting,  is  dedicated  –  as  Ricœur  says  –  to  understanding  the  nature  
of  our  representations  of  the  past,  and  to  the  multiple  ways  in  which  they  determine  us,  since  by  
being  historical   the  human  condition   implies  an  approach   to   reality  which  necessarily   involves  
any  individual.  At  the  beginning  of  the  third  part  of  Memory,  History,  Forgetting  –  on  the  notion  of  
the  historical  condition  –  Ricœur  makes  the  following  question:  “What  is  it  to  understand  in  the  
historical  mode?”11  This  is  an  essential  question  as  it  refers  to  the  fact  that,  once  excluded  from  a  
totalizing  mode  of  reflection,  the  human  being  is  pushed  towards  a  way  of  knowing  himself  and  
the  world  inevitably  framed  by  his  historical  condition,  i.e.,  to  “a  situation  in  which  each  person  
is   in   each   case   implicated.”12   And   this   is   the   perspective   which   leads   us   directly   to   the  
unavoidable   role   played   by   memory,   in   a   double   sense:   (1)   because   “[…]   the   phenomena   of  
memory,   so   closely   connected   to  what  we   are,   oppose   the  most   obstinate   of   resistances   to   the  
hubris  of  total  reflection”13  and,  (2)  because  “collective  memory  […]  constitutes  the  soil  in  which  
historiography  is  rooted.”14    
In  Memory,  History,   Forgetting   Paul  Ricœur  writes   that   his   book   “is   a   plea   on   behalf   of  
memory   as   the   womb   of   history,   inasmuch   as   memory   remains   the   guardian   of   the   entire  
problem   of   the   representative   relation   of   the   present   to   the   past.”15   What   exactly   does   this  
statement   mean   within   the   whole   articulation   of   the   book?   It   is   certainly   not   the   case   that  
memory  and  history  are  indistinguishable  or  can  cohabit  promiscuously  with  each  other  –  even  
because  their  referential  fields  are  completely  different:  Whereas  the  first  one  concerns  accuracy,  
the   second   concerns   truth.   And   as   Ricœur   himself   stresses,   History   proceeds   to   a   scientific  
severance   of   any   kind   of   relation  with   a   living   experience   of   remembrance.   Their   connections  
consist  instead  in  what  one  might  call  a  “mutual  potentiation  ”:  nemory  serves  history,  and  history,  
in   turn,   consolidates   and   perpetuates   a   certain  memory   or,   better   said,   it   legitimates   a   certain  
memory.    
To  reach  a  broad  understanding  of  what  is  at  stake  in  this  idea,  we  must  reflect  further  on  
the   long  hermeneutic   route  made  by  Paul  Ricœur   in  his  major  work   from   the   1980’s:  Time   and  
Narrative.   Some   essential   clues   from   that   work   are   recovered   by  Memory,   History,   Forgetting,  
namely,   the   category   of   “representation”   or   “lieutenancy”   that   is   used   to   describe   the   kind   of  
relationship  History  holds  with  its  object  of  study  –  its  main  feature  is  not  to  be  “observable  but  
memorable.”16   With   this   statement,   Ricœur   aims   at   uncovering   the   idea   that   the   study   of  
historical  objects  is  fragile  and  that  they  only  become  object  of  study  through  a  process  of  reading  
and  interpretation.    Be  it  the  document  where  the  happened  is  reported  or  the  trace  that  recalls  it,  
the  past  that  becomes  an  object  to  historiography  is  always  intrinsically  interpretative.  And  this  is  
precisely  the  form  of  relation  with  the  past  that  Ricœur  labels  “  representation  “  or  “lieutenancy,”  
words  that  refer  to  the  notion  of  being-­‐‑in-­‐‑place-­‐‑of  –  which  properly  accounts  for  the  specificity  of  
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passed  but  still  remains  present,  through  traces  or  testimonies.  And  the  idea  of  “representation  “  
or  “lieutenancy”  is  itself  framed  by  the  notion  of  reconstruction,  the  ontological  mode  of  the  past  
being  marked  by  the  double  feature  of  loss  and  recovery.    This  way  of  facing  the  object  of  history  
reduces   its   epistemological   force17   and  may   help   us   account   for   the   Ricœurian   statement   that  
memory  is  the  matrix  of  history.    
What  Time   and  Narrative   left   unexplored   and  Memory,  History,   Forgetting   exposes   is   the  
influence  history  can  have  over  memory  –  especially  over  collective  memory,   thus  allowing  for  
an  indestructible  hermeneutic  circle  to  be  set  between  both.    Ricœur  calls  this  influence  of  history  
over  collective  memory  an  institutionalization  of  a  certain  collective  memory,  whereby  the  latter  gets  
the   seal   of   the   “true  memory,”   since   it   is   held   by   the   epistemological   force   of   historiography.  
Ricœur  presents  this  idea  as  follows:  “[…]  imposed  memory  is  armed  with  a  history  that  is  itself  
“authorized,”  the  official  history,  the  history  publicly  learned  and  celebrated.  A  trained  memory  
is,  in  fact,  on  the  institutional  plane  an  instructed  memory.”18  
Understanding  that   idea  means  to  take  into  account  the  fact   that  Paul  Ricœur  chose  for  
the   title   of   his  work   still   another   element   –   forgetting   –  which   has   a   crucial   role   to   play   in   an  
overall  understanding  of  the  text  as  a  whole  –  whether  for  the  articulation  between  memory  and  
history  or  for  the  issue  of  forgiveness  Ricœur  addresses  in  the  end  of  the  book.    
From   all   the   Ricœurian   analysis   of   memory   I   would   like   to   stress   the   importance   of  
exercised  memory,  since  this  is  the  kind  of  memory  that  directly  matches  the  notion  of  forgetting  –  
namely,  within  the  scope  of  the  implications  of  uses  and  abuses  of  both.  Ricœur  says  the  abuse  of  
memory  and   the  abuse  of   forgetting  are   two  undesirable  extremes,   thus  highlighting   the  ethic-­‐‑
political  dimension  of  a  duty  towards  a  fair  memory.  In  this  respect,  Ricœur  will  say  that  too  much  
as  well  as  too  little  memory  reveal  a  deficit  of  criticism.    To  support  his  views  on  this  respect,  our  
philosopher  will  convoke  the  work  of  two  major  thinkers:  Halbwachs  e  Freud.    
Taking  into  account  Halbwachs’  work  from  the  1950’s  –  La  Mémoire  Collective  –,  Ricœur  
will   then  write  about   the  primacy  (thus  non-­‐‑derivativeness)  of  collective  memory,  by  exploring  
three  fundamental  ideas:  (1)  we  don’t  remember  things  alone,  but  always  with  others;  (2)  a  great  
deal   of   our   memory   is   built   upon   other   human   beings’   narratives;   and   (3)   our   memories   are  
framed  by  collective  narratives  and  strengthened  by  public  acts  within  a  public  sphere.    
From   Freud   –   namely   from   his   Recollection,   Repetition,   Working   Through   (1914)   and  
Mourning  and  Melancholia  (1917)  –  Ricoeur  would  borrow  some  key-­‐‑concepts  in  order  to  approach  
‘exercised  memory’   and   the   corresponding   relationship   with   forgetting.   The   philosopher   then  
explored   the  Freudian  perspective  on   the  repression  of   traumatic  memories  which  are  replaced  
by   a   repetition  pattern   of   behavior   –   the   essence   of   the   latter   being   a   refusal   to   look  upon   the  
wound  and  the  trauma,  at  the  same  time  that  a  repetitive  behavior  is  put  into  action  so  that  we  
can   forget   what   happened   before   that   harmed   us.   Along   the   same   line   of   reasoning,   Ricœur  
insists  on  another  Freudian  view  –  the  impossibility  of  forgetting  a  lost  object,  which  determines  
a  psychological   fixation  preventing   the   individual   from  setting  herself   free  and  doing  a  proper  
mourning   (thus   separating   her   ego   from   the   lost   object).   This   fixation   does   not   allow   the  
individual  to  establish  new  affective  involvements.  In  both  cases,  we  face  a  pattern  of  inflexible  
behavior,  which  is  neither  creative  nor  self-­‐‑fulfilling.    
Based  on  the  interlacing  of  both  perspectives,  Ricœur  will  then  set  up  the  hypothesis  that  
historiography   should  both   reflect  on  and  mourn   its  own   tradition,   in  order   to  overcome   rigid  
and  repetitive  readings  of   the  past  which  conceived   it  as  a  dead  reservoir,  and  examine  certain  
social  phenomena  –  namely,  celebrations  and  commemorations  which  praise  certain  happenings  
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while  forgetting  others  –  in  order  to  account  for  repressed  or  manipulated  memory  by  analogy.  
In  each  case  there  is  a  wound  unhealed  or  a  debt  of  memory  that  is  left  unpaid.    
I   say   it   again:   Ricœur’s   analyses   were   focused   on   very   precise   historical   issues,   like  
Apartheid   or   the  Shoa,   representing   circumscribed   and   dated   events,  which   perfectly  matched  
such  notions  as  “trauma”  or  “social  wounding.”  And   this   is   certainly  not  what  happened  with  
the   (social)   issue   I   am   hereby   addressing   –  where,   to   borrow   some  words   by   Ricœur   himself,  
what   is  at  stake   is  an  exercised  memory  that  grounded  discrimination  against  women  in  a  past  
that  may  date  back  a  few  centuries.     Nevertheless,   I   think  it   is  possible  to  restore  Ricœur’s   idea  
and   put   it   into   work   at   a   conceptual   platform   on   legitimate   and   taught   memory   in   all   that  
concerns  women  and  the  feminine  –  a  platform  that  built  our  culture  and  formed  just  as  much  a  
repetitive,  rigid  and  uncreative  heritage.    
In   a   text   full   of   references   to  Ricœur’s   thought,19   Johann  Michel   explores   the   idea   I   am  
here  outlining,  calling  our  attention,  on  the  one  hand,  to  the  dialectics  that  could  be  established  
between  Ricœur’s  approach  to  forgetting  and  the  configuration  of  a  public  memory  and,  on  the  
other  hand,  to  how  that  public  memory  could  be  no  more  than  a  trap  in  the  process  of  building  a  
canonical   narrative   to   be   repeated   over   and   over   again.   Now,   this   is   precisely   where   the  
fundamental   topic   of   this   article   lies:   the  perpetuation  of   a   single  point   of   view  about   the  past  
ends  up  dismissing  other  possible  perspectives  (memories)  of  it,   turning  that  past  into  a  closed,  
impenetrable  thing  –  thus  converting  the  past  into  a  dead  tradition.    
As  regards  the  question  of  gender,  this  perspective  crystallized  into  a  “taught  memory”  
which  silenced  or  at   least  minimized   the  contribution  of  women   to   the  development  of   culture  
and  history  and  destroyed  some  possibilities  for  Women’s  Studies  to  raise  fundamental  questions  
for   its   development.   That  was   indeed  what   happened   in   anthropological   debates,   for   instance,  
where  the  very  existence  of  the  two  sexes  was  ignored  and  women  were  discriminated  against.  
This  apparent  contradiction  was  actually  made  possible  for  two  main  reasons.  To  begin  with,  the  
texts   that  make  up  our  collective  memory  only  discuss  human  nature   in  general,  with  no  place  
whatsoever  for  particularities,  even  though  they  conceive  such  “human  nature”  from  a  masculine  
point   of   view   or   from   the   point   of   view   of   the   neutral   universal.   Furthermore,   there   is   a  
“background  noise”  also  incorporated  in  collective  and  taught  memory  to  the  effect  that  feminine  
should   be  defined   as   a   derivation   of   the  masculine   and   always   by   contrast  with   it.   This   is   the  
main  reason  why  women  are  anthropologically  defined  as  beings  lacking  something  –  whether  in  
the  Aristotelian  or  in  the  Freudian  framework,  just  to  mention  two  paradigms  –  and  also  why  the  
construct  became  a  norm,  thus  naturalizing  one  perspective.    
If,   however,   we   follow   Ricœur   in   believing   that   “A   school   class   is,   in   this   respect,   a  
privileged   place   for   this   shift   in   viewpoint   in   memory,”20   we   will   have   to   acknowledge   how  
important   it   is   to  assume   the  ethic-­‐‑political   responsibility  of  building  a   fair  memory  of  women  
and  the  feminine,  that  could  support  new  legitimate  and  taught  points  of  view.  And  there  is  yet  
another   consequence   –   no   less   negative   than   the   anthropological   one  mentioned   above   –   of   a  
certain  inheritance  of  memory  that  is  related  to  the  extremes  of  too  much  and  too  little  memory:  the  
problem  of   identity  which,  as   it   is  well-­‐‑known,   in  Paul  Ricœur   is   indelibly  associated  with   time,  
since  it  is  conceptualized  as  “narrative  identity.”    
Identity,  Recognition  and  Time:    Indissolubility  and  Vulnerability  
It   is   widely   accepted   –   by   different   and   sometimes   even   irreconcilable   theoretical  
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Paul  Ricœur  engages  in  dialogue  with  some  authors  involved  in  that  issue  –  namely,  Taylor  and  
Honneth.  The  main  reason  for  Ricœur’s  disagreement  with  both  thinkers  lies  in  his  saying  that  it  
is  the  category  of  narrative  identity  which  assures  the  first  necessary  recognition,  built  up  in  the  
articulation  of  identity  and  self-­‐‑recognition.  And  that  is  the  reason  why  identity,  recognition  and  
time  form  an  interconnected  hermeneutic  trilogy,  marked  by  precariousness  and  vulnerability.    
Ricœur  establishes  this  interconnection  between  identity  and  time  at  the  very  beginning  
of   his   philosophical   approach   to   identity,   through   the   notion   of   “narrative   identity”   –   in   its  
double  dimension  of  “personal  identity”  and  “collective  identity”  –  in  the  conclusions  of  Time  and  
Narrative.   There,   this   notion   was   put   side   by   side   with   the   first   aporia   of   temporality:   the  
impossibility   of   binding   phenomenological   and   cosmological   time,   and   it   was   the   rejeton   of  
hermeneutic   circularity   that   framed   such   connection.  The   emergence  of   the   issue  of   identity   in  
Ricœur’s  thought  thus  lies  in  the  aporetical  rooting  of  the  problem  of  identity  and  is  marked  by  
the  same  kind  of  vulnerability  mentioned  above.21        
In  Memory,  History,  Forgetting,  the  fragility  of  identity  is  resumed  again  in  the  theoretical  
framing  of  memory  and  history,  and  there  Ricœur  saysthat  “as  the  primary  cause  of  the  fragility  
of   identity  we  must  cite   its  difficult   relation   to   time,”  besides  stressing   the   fundamental   role  of  
memory  in  shaping  identity.  For  that  reason  the  philosopher  goes  on  stating  that  “the  heart  of  the  
problem   is   the  mobilization  of  memory   in   the   service  of   the  quest,   the  appeal,   the  demand   for  
identity.”22    
We   have   now   reached   another   determinant   platform   of   reasoning   in   this   reflection,  
which   can   be   materialized   in   the   following   question:   could   the   narratives   of   the   history   of  
philosophy   and   of   culture   broadly   construed   help   women   building   their   identity   –   whether  
individually  or  collectively  –  in  terms  of  human  balance  and  positivity?  In  other  words:  are  there  
any  manifestations  of  positive  recognition  of  women  and  the  feminine  in  texts,  theories  or  well-­‐‑
known  explanations  presented  by  the  western  tradition  up  to  the  present  day?  And  is  there  really  
a  problem  here?    
In  the  seventeenth  century,  Poulain  de  la  Barre  presented  himself  as  an  apologist  of  the  
cause   of   women,   by   stressing   the   necessity   of   approaching   the   issue   of   gender   equality   in   a  
rational   way,   so   that   old   and   repeated   prejudices   set   against   women   and   spread   over   the  
centuries   could   be   dispelled.   For   him   there   was   no   doubt   about   the   negative   impact   those  
prejudices  have  had  upon  women  and  their  tainted  representations  of  themselves  –  which,  in  his  
view,   constituted   an   inviolable   prison   as   well   as   an   irremovable   impediment   for   a   whole  
development.23  The  introjection  of  misconceived  widely  accepted  images  about  the  inferiority  of  
the   feminine  prevented  women   from  overcoming  a   centenary  situation  of   subalternity,  Poulain  
de  la  Barre  argued.      
And  today  as  in  the  seventeenth  century,  if  one  sticks  to  certain  social  phenomena  and  to  
some  statements  about  the  role  played  by  recognition  in  the  process  of  constructing  identity,  one  
should  still  answer  the  above  question  affirmatively.  Charles  Taylor  –  just  to  single  out  an  author  
with   whom   Paul   Ricœur   set   up   a   dialogue   on   this   issue   –   has   argued   for   the   importance   of  
singling   out   the   role   of   recognition   in   the  whole   process   of   identity   construction.   The   leading  
issue,   for   Taylor,   is   related   to   the   recognition   and   the   identity   of   specific   cultures.24   What  
mediates  this  relation  is  the  notion  of  “authenticity.”  Identity  has  to  do  with  knowing  what  one  is  
for  others.  Now,  Taylor  points  out  that  it  is  recognition  that  determines  identity  construction  in  a  
significant  way.  Identities  are  constructed  in  the  context  of  interations.  Others,  their  looking  upon  
me,  determine  the  way  I  look  upon  myself.  If  there  is  no  recognition  –  in  the  sense  of  a  positive  
valuation   –   the   resulting   appreciation   is   not   internalized   and   becomes   oppressing,   leading   to  
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inauthenticity.  Taylor  defends  accordingly  the  urgency  to  establish  social  conditions  allowing  for  
recognition  among  cultural  differences,  so  that  both  cultures  and  individuals  within  them  could  
be  faithful  to  themselves  and  to  their  models  of  authenticity.    
Even  if  Ricœur  did  not  build  up  a  systematic  theory  of  recognition  –  in  that  his  work  is  
no  more   than  a  course  –,  his   itinerary   threw  some   light  on  a  defining   feature  of  such  a  project.  
That  feature  is  the  constitutive  asymmetry  of  different  processes  of  recognition  and  it  grounds  all  
the   positions   defending   an   interaction   between   recognition   and   identity   construction.   By  
subscribing   to   this  notion  of  asymmetry  as  a  defining   feature  of   recognition  and  applying   it   to  
some   theoretical   models   on   women   and   the   feminine   that   have   defined   our   culture   –   from  
Aristotle’s   notion   of   the   “unfinished  male”   to   the   Freudian   proposal   of   “penis-­‐‑envy”   –   I   have  
been  insisting  upon  the  fact  that  women  were  always  conceived  either  as  the  “reciprocal  other”  
or,  from  an  external  point  of  view,  as  a  dissonant  alterity.  This  being  the  case  and  aiming  at  doing  
justice   to   Simone   Beauvoir’s   idea   of   the   feminine   as   “the   second   sex,”   I   have   reached   the  
conclusion  that,  as  far  as  women  are  concerned,  the  constitutive  asymmetry  of  recognition  turned  
into  a  kind  of  “exteriority”  of  the  essential  core  of  what  it  is  to  be  human.  
If  we   now   take   into   account   all   that  was   said   above   on   collective  memory,   individual  
memory  and  taught  memory  –  in  other  words,  on  memory  legitimized  by  history  –  I  think  we  are  
bound  to  conclude  that  women  have  at  their  disposal  no  more  than  a  poor  and  unattractive  scope  
of   elements  upon  which   they   can  build   their   identity,  both  as   individuals  and  as  a  group.   It   is  
thus   mandatory   to   explore   new   ways   of   turning   memory   into   a   vehicle   for   other   sorts   of  
narratives  to  emerge,  which  may  provide  women  with  representations  of  themselves  equivalent  
in  terms  of  dignity  to  those  available  to  men.    
If,  as  Paul  Ricœur  says,  memory  is  crucial  to  any  kind  of  vindication  of  identity,  then  it  is  
also  indispensable  to  reconfigure  a  philosophical  memory  of  any  kind  of  issue  related  to  gender  
questions   –   so   that   the   present   philosophical   state   of   affairs   concerning   those   topics   could   be  
modified,   and   canonical   asymmetries,   both   in   texts   and   in   themes,   may   be   discarded   in   the  
future.  And  if  we  recall  Ricœur’s  statement  that  a  school  class  is  a  privileged  place  for  a  shifting  
in  viewpoint  in  memory,  we  should  also  be  allowed  to  dream  about  a  History  of  Philosophy  still  
to  be  accomplished,  where  a  whole  set  of  existential  questions  unsettling  humanity  in  its  double  
composition  of  Men  and  Women  could  be  made  apparent  and  which  would  take  upon  itself  the  
responsibility  to  build  a  fair  ethic-­‐‑political  memory.      
It  is  Possible  and  Legitimate  to  Test  Other  Narratives  of  the  Past  
“Why,   in   the   transmission   from   future   to   past,   should   the   present   not   be   the   time   of  
initiative  –  that  is,  the  time  when  the  weight  of  history  that  has  already  been  made  is  deposited,  
suspended,  and  interrupted,  and  when  the  dream  of  history  yet  to  be  made  is  transposed  into  a  
responsible  decision?  Therefore   it   is  within   the  dimension  of  acting   (and  suffering,  which   is   its  
corollary)   that   thought  about  history  will  bring   together   its  perspectives,  within   the  horizon  of  
the  idea  of  an  imperfect  mediation.”25  
The   above   quotation   is   a   good   synthesis   of   what   has   been   this   study’s   essential  
theoretical  goal,  at  the  same  time  that  it  makes  room  for  the  next  topic  of  my  analysis,  based  on  a  
systematic  exploration  of  that  quote.  In  the  previous  section,  I  tried  to  demonstrate  that  Ricœur’s  
thought   allows   for   grounding   the   necessity   and   fruitfulness   of   construing   a   critical   collective  
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towards   them.   In  what   follows,   I  will   explore   the  Ricœurian  proposal   that   such  construction   is  
not  only  necessary  but  legitimate.    
The  notion  of  “imperfect  mediations”  is  the  fundamental  theoretical  background  for  the  
text   quoted   above,   a   notion   that   uncovers   a  whole   understanding   horizon   of   Ricœur’s  work   –  
articulating,  more  specifically,  the  concepts  of  memory  and  history.  In  the  chapter  titled  “Should  
we   renounce  Hegel?”   in   the   third  volume  of  Time   and  Narrative,   Ricœur   clearly   stated   such   an  
articulation.   To   put   it   concisely,   his   thesis   runs   as   follows:   Hegel   constitutes   the   eternal  
temptation   for   those   seeking   to   understand   the   real   and,   at   the   same   time,   the   irredeemable  
impossibility  imposed  by  the  strict  requirements  of  critical  thought.26    That  is  why  he  would  say,  
over  and  over  again,  that  “we  must  choose  between  Hermeneutics  and  Absolute  Knowledge”  –  
this   choice   is   the  defining   feature  of   any  question,  placing   it   always   short   of   a   totally  unifying  
conceptual  synthesis.  
This   is   also   the   conceptual   framework   for   two   other   slogans   Ricœur   will   repeat  
throughout  his  work:  first,  “one  should  explain  more  if  one  wants  to  understand  better”;  second,  
“it  is  always  possible  to  understand  differently.”  That  is  to  say,  the  whole  process  of  approaching  
a   certain   theoretical   issue   is   constitutively   developed   within   a   hermeneutic   circle   where  
progresses  only  take  place  if  a  dialogue  is  set  with  other  approaches  to  the  same  issue,  whether  
from  the  same  theoretical  standpoint  or  from  a  different  one.  It  is  never  the  case  that  we  can  rely  
on  a  straight,  linear  progression  leading  to  a  conceptual  unified  outcome.27      
Another  aspect  belonging   to   the  notion  of  “imperfect  mediation”   I  would   like   to   stress  
concerns  a  way  of  conceiving  the  present  “as  initiative.”      Time  and  evil  are  central  philosophical  
issues   in  Ricœur’s  work.  The  philosopher  argues   that  evil   is  an  embarrassment   to  be   faced  and  
time  is  the  enabling  structure  of  being  and  acting.  In  The  Voluntary  and  the  Involuntary  –  the  book  
shaping   the  whole   of   his   philosophical   project   –   Ricœur   sets   an   analysis   of   the   voluntary   act,  
presenting   time,   on   its   dual   aspect   of   subjectively   lived   and   vitally   consented   time,   as   a  
constitutive  feature  of  acting.    These  two  main  features  of  temporality  will  be  taken  up  again  in  
Time  and  Narrative  –and  then  be  restated  in  Memory,  History,  Forgetting.    
When   talking   about   the   present   as   initiative,   Ricœur   will   part   from   St.   Augustine’s  
position  to  the  effect  that  the  present   is  “fleeting  attention,”  since  he  wants  to  move  away  from  
“the  prestige  of  presence,   in  the  quasi-­‐‑optical  sense  of  the  term.”28  What  interests  him  –  Ricœur  
goes  on  to  say  –  is  to  dethrone  the  present  as  a  visual  category  and  include  it  under  the  categories  
of   acting   and   suffering   (or   enduring   –   in   the   sense   of   passivity   and   not   merely   as   physical  
suffering).    
And   what   is   at   stake   here   is   already   the   main   point   Ricœur   will   make   in  Oneself   as  
Another:   the   fact   that   to   be   human   is   to   be   capable   of,   that   is   to   say,   to   be   able   to   say   “  I   can.”  
Relying  on  a  similar  purpose,  he  had  already  stressed  in  The  Voluntary  and  the  Involuntary  that  a  
will   rooted   in   an   embodied   existence  may   be   defined   as   a   “motivated  will.”   In   Ricœur’s   own  
words  “wanting  is  not  creating,  but  it  is  not  suffering  either.”  Human  freedom  and  initiative  only  
turn   real   if   they   fully   assume   the   consequences   of   their   existential   rooting.   Having   a   body   is  
simultaneously   to   hold  power   and   to   be  deprived   of   it   –   the   consent   to   be  deprived   of   power  
being  the  very  ontological  platform  for  the  fulfillment  of  human  capacity.    
Oneself   as   Another   is   perhaps   the   most   important   work   by   Ricœur   if   one   wants   to  
understand   the   notion   of   “the   power   to   act,”   the   human   initiative   capacity.   It   is   in   the   fourth  
study  of  the  book  –  which  deals  with  the  articulation  between  agent  and  action  –  that  such  notion  
is   particularly   stressed.   Ricœur   sets   his   reflection   in   the   framework   of   the   third   Kantian  
antinomy,  underlining   the  difference  between  a  beginning  of   the  world  and  a  beginning   in   the  
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world,  thus  coining  the  notion  of  “practical  beginning”  by  arguing  for  the  effectiveness  of  human  
action  or,  as  he  himself  put  it,  “the  power  to  do  things,  that  is  to  produce  changes  in  the  world.”29  
Thus,  human  initiative  is  the  ability  to  start  something  new,  even  if  such  start  is  bound  to  be  no  
more  than  “  give  a  new  course  to  things,  starting  from  an  initiative  that  announces  a  continuation  
and  hence  opens  something  ongoing.  To  begin  is  to  begin  to  continue.”30  
Finally,  it  is  important  to  understand  the  connection  between  the  future  and  the  past  that  
the   text   quoted   above   presupposes.   Ricœur   responds   to   that   connection   with   the   idea   of   the  
present  as  initiative.    Ricœur’s  great  source  of  inspiration  for  the  analysis  of  this  topic  was  the  work  
by   Reinhart   Koselleck,   and   his   analytical   categories   of   “space   of   experience”   and   “horizon   of  
expectation”  –  used  to  define  the  human  relationship  with  historical  time.  And  the  whole  of  the  
Ricoeurian   understanding   of   humankind’s   historical   condition   is   marked   by   the   way   he  
conceptually   operates   with   those   two  meta-­‐‑categories   and   how   they   are   subsumed   under   the  
idea  of  the  present  as  initiative.      
Let  us  now  go  back  to  Ricœur’s  statement:  “Why,  in  the  transmission  from  future  to  past,  
should  the  present  not  be  the  time  of  initiative  –  that  is,  the  time  when  the  weight  of  history  that  
has  already  been  made  is  deposited,  suspended,  and  interrupted,  and  when  the  dream  of  history  
yet  to  be  made  is  transposed  into  a  responsible  decision?”  Let  me  underline  five  keywords  here:  
transmission,   deposited,   suspended,   interrupted,   dream.      These   terms   express   how   Ricœur  
approaches   the  relationship  between  the  past  and  the   future  when   it  comes  to   the   formation  of  
the  human  mode  of  being  and  the  making  of  history.  There  is  a  specific  bridge  between  past  and  
future,  since  each  future  has  a  singular  past.  However,  that  bridge  is  not  a  sort  of  determination  –  
on  the  contrary;  it  expresses  an  enabling  and  mutually  conditioning  relation.  There  is  no  straight  
symmetry   between   past   and   future.   That   is   the   reason   why,   according   to   Ricoeur,   one   must  
surpass   the   idea   that   the  past   is  a   fixed,  changeless   thing.  Quite  on   the  contrary  –  “We  have   to  
reopen  the  past,  to  revivify  its  unaccomplished,  cut-­‐‑off  –  even  slaughtered  –  possibilities.”31    We  
are   beings   affected   by   the   past   and   such   affection  will   mark   our   future   –   but   it   is   neither   an  
indelible  mark  nor  a  destiny.  One  must  deal  with  the  past  as  the  “space  of  experience”  allowing  
us   to  make   it   into   a   living   tradition   that   itself   turns   the   present   into   initiative   –   among   other  
things  to  uncover  in  the  past  other  possibilities.    
It  is  once  again  necessary  to  recall  that  what  is  here  at  stake  is  the  ontological  character  of  
the   past.   Ricœur   wants   to   separate   his   own   approach   to   the   past   from   what   he   calls   the  
“retrospective  illusion  of  fate”  –  which  is  certainly  connected  with  a  conception  of  historiography  
that   is  purely  retrospective  and  abstracts   the  past   from  other   temporal  extases:   the  present  and  
the   future.   Ricœur   opposes   that   kind   of   approach   to   a   Heideggerian   one,   marked   by   a  
constitutive   binding   of   past,   present   and   future   and  within   which   it   is   possible   to   conceive   a  
living  tradition,  set  upon  a  dialectics  of  tradition-­‐‑innovation.  This  is  the  approach  justifying  “the  
dream  of  a  History  still  to  be  made”  –  available  and  even  imposed  upon  us.  The  future  may  well  
be  the  so-­‐‑called  “horizon  of  expectation,”  the  “not  yet,”  but  there  is  a  “transmission  from  future  
to  past.”  Concurrently,  horizons  of  expectation  should  not  be  merely  utopic,  with  no  rooting  or  
resonance  in  the  past.    
As  I  understand  it,  the  present  as  initiative  opens  up  the  possibility  for  us  to  inquiry  the  
past  in  a  way  that  could  fulfill  all  its  unaccomplished  and  even  blocked  potentialities  –  and  from  
them  shape  new  horizons  of  expectation.  Or,  as  Ricœur  says,  one  must  bear  in  mind  all  the  while  
that   “reality   is   not   to  be   totalized”32   –   and   that   send  us  back   again   to   the  notion  of   “imperfect  
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Let  us   recall  Ricœur’s   statement   that   “reality   is  not   to  be   totalized,”  as   it   supports   two  
key  points  to  be  made  in  these  final  remarks:  1)  about  our  capacity  for  initiative  and  2)  about  its  
implications  for  the  non-­‐‑totalizable  character  of  reality.  Both  insights  give  rise  to  a  legitimate  look  
to  the  past  for  a  platform  where  gender  questions  can  be  uncovered  and  brought  into  the  present.  
This  makes   room   for   gender   issues   in   academic   syllabi   –   in   the   general   canon   of   studies   and,  
more  specifically,   in  philosophical  studies.  To  achieve  that,  a  new  direction  is  needed  –one  that  
carries   on   a   certain   tradition,   but   changes   its   beginnings.   These   unexpected   and   unrealized  
beginnings   should   give   voice   to   all   those   people   that   always   questioned   themselves   about   the  
nature  of  the  feminine,  using  sometimes  polemical  or  contradictory  arguments.    
In  this  context,  it  seems  possible  and  legitimate  to  provide  women  and  men  with  a  fresh  
overview   of   the   past   –   one   that   may   count   as   a   new   theoretical   space   of   experience   able   to  
encompass  other  “horizons  of  expectation.”  These  expectations  are  not  merely  utopian  but  also  
can  be  grounded  in  past  events   that  a  certain  canon  has  blocked  or  precluded.  As  Ricœur  said,  
the  past  has  an  unaccomplished  potential  and  is  by  no  means  unchangeable;  in  a  certain  way,  it  
has   not   completely   passed.   That   is   the   reason   why   it   is   possible   and   legitimate   to   reopen   it,  
bringing  new  characters  and  texts  onto  the  stage  of  history  –   thereby  creating  a  space   in  which  
Women’s  Studies  is  neither  excluded  nor  ghettoized.  
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